Puritan Society in Winthrops

In his work â€Å"Remembering John Winthrop- Hawthorne’s Suggestion† Matthew Holland calls John Winthrop powerful but unclear, well-liked and despised, completely unwanted by some while other energetically fight traditionalists to make him an image of ideal. The author finds very strange the fact that being a critic of Puritanism, Nathaniel Hawthorn turns our attentions to Winthrop’s ideas of charity (Holland 1). According to Holland, The Scarlet Letter testifies that Hawthorne was not at the Puritans’ side and did not consider their values to be right.Since Winthrop is primarily connected with the origin and propagation of Puritan ideas, it is not possible that Hawthorne could not consider him to be deserved an honor. Notwithstanding that Winthrop’s own use of ideology of Christian love can influence Hawthorne’s attitude positively, this can’t overshadow the excessively cruel social arrangement Winthrop created (Holland 12). Holland s tates that Hawthorne simply considered Winthrop to be a normally righteous exclusion to a Puritanism that generates just wickedness and tyranny.However, Hawthorne noted that Winthrop was an outstanding person way, a leader of his age, elected by his contemporaries and reelected for several times. Trepanier, Lee. â€Å"The need for Renewal: Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Conservatism. † Modern Age, Fall 2003, Vol. 45. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. 1 March 2007. In â€Å"The need for Renewal: Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Conservatism† Lee Trepanier describes Hawthorne's attempts to renovate the Puritan heritage by means of art (Trepanier 200) .The author tries to explain to us the final breakdown of Hawthorne's artistic and sacred views and tries to find out how actual breakdown influenced our evaluation of Puritan heritage. According to Lee Trepanier, The Scarlet Letter is usually understood as a story of morality, where the traditions of Puritanism and defenselessnes s of people are perfectly represented. However, the author explains the way how to fight with defenselessness stating â€Å"life is strictly a function of ‘mechanism; and that having knowledge of the mechanism is to have power over life itself† (317).Michaelsen, Scott. â€Å"John Winthrop's ‘Modell’ Covenant and the Company Way. † Early American Literature, 1992: 85-100 Scott Michaelsen reminds the reader that straight after their coming to the New England to create a new civilization founded on the Calvinism, Puritans were perceived as cultured, hard-working and established. Today their influence is the New England are to coming to naught, it is heritage still is felt in the society (Michaelsen 10). The author told us that American leaders of the past century cite John Winthrop.However, they sometimes overlook his anti- sovereign political theory. Michaelsen explains, that Winthrop’s creations – and A Model of Christian Charity is one of them – were not well-liked by his contemporaries, due to the reason that the he did not create any new values of Puritanism and simply talked about the ideas developed by someone else earlier (Michaelsen 60). Winthrop stated that real pure feeling was present only before the sin of Adam and Eve, while the modern imperfect society needs charity preservation.According to him, such qualities as forgiveness and fairness play more important role than love in our society today. However, the author argues that people must know their obligations and be merciless to one another (Michaelsen 91). People are commonly upset because of the severity of Winthrop's viewpoint. This state is generated by reading some literature of Winthrop's supposition connected with the power of patriarchy and the live of women in the Puritan society.It is essential to note how our modern ideas about what is right and wrong can occasionally differ from those in the society Winthrop lived in. Schweitzer, Iv y. John Winthrop's Model of American Affiliation. Early American Literature, 2005: 441-69 In his article the Schweitzer provides the John Winthrop’s work and values evaluation. According to the author of the article Ivy Schweitzer lately, researchers started to investigate the Age of Reason’s veneration of and devotion to composed motivation, and to discuss the ‘‘emotional history of the United States’’ (441).Schweister states that In his study of early American influence, the author Peter Coviello says that the population appears under the influence the oratory of its main leaders through the tactical expression of powerful feelings of failure and parting that make a very contrasting and extensively alienated colonial population to unite (Schweitzer 442). According to Schweister, this not just paves the way and creates the political establishment of the new nationality however it develops the ability for emotional reaction as a precondition f or â€Å"virtuous republican citizenship† (441).

Four Rightly Guided Caliphs Essay

Muhammad’s mission, like many other prophets, was to call people to the worship and submission of the one true God. After his death this mission was left to those whom followed his teachings. Those who truly followed in the Prophet’s foot steps were proclaimed The Rightly Guided Caliphs. They were Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, Uthman and Ali, and were the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, all of which were amongst the earliest and closest companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Each of these Caliphs contributed greatly to the development of Islam as well as the contradictory emergence of the Sunni and Shi’ite schism. Abu Bakr was the first of the four Caliphs and ruled from 632-634 A. C. Abu Bakr was unfortunate to have the burden of leadership placed on him during the most sensitive of Muslim times. Since the death of Muhammad was quickly spreading, many Muslims and tribes decided to rebel, refusing to pay Zakat. Also, many claimed that the prophethood of Muhammad had been placed on them, this only made the tribes revolt stronger. He had to deal with the threat of two powerful empires, the Roman Empire and the Persian, of which threatened Islamic state in Medina. Abu Bakr himself led a charge against the revolting tribes who attacked Medina and forced them to retreat. Although the threat of the Roman army still remained, Muhammad had already sent out an army and when he died, Abu Bakr took over. With fierce determination he said â€Å"I shall send Usama’s army on its way as ordered by the Prophet, even if I am left alone. † Throughout the rule of Abu Bakr, troops went from one victory to another from attacking Romans. Another contribution of the Caliph was that he encouraged many of Muhammad’s friends to commit his teachings to memory. Memories all of which were written down to form the Qu’ran. All together without his leadership; the people of Islamic faith would have gone riot. He helped restore stability to the Islamic people. On top of this, he contributed to the writing of the Qu’ran and the keeping of the people safe with all his military forces. During the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar was his closest assistant and adviser. When Abu Bakr died on the 23rd of August 643 A. C, all the people of Medina swore allegiance to ‘Umar who became the second Caliph. Upon taking charge ‘Uman spoke to the people with conviction and said â€Å"O people, remain conscious of God, forgive me my faults and help me in my task. Assist me in enforcing what is good and forbidding what is evil. Advise me regarding the obligations that have been imposed upon me by God†¦ † ‘Umar did exactly that. He enforced the good and forbade evil. Within the first years of his leadership he completed Islam’s conquest of Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt and Persia. During ‘Umar’s Caliphate, he was majorly responsible for the vast expansion of Islam and was considered a highly effective military leader. He also commanded the construction of the Mosque, also know as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. When ‘Umar returned to Medina from Hajj he raised his hands and prayed, â€Å"O God! I am advanced in years, my bones are weary, my powers are declining, and the people for whom I am responsible have spread far and wide. Summon me back to Thyself, my lord! † Before his death, ‘Umar went to a Mosque to lead in prayer where he was attacked and stabbed several time and fell under the assassins dagger. Before he died, the people asked him to nominate his successor. Umar appointed a committee of the Prophets followers to appoint the leader among themselves. ‘Umar died in the first week of Muharram, 24 A and Uthman was appointed as his successor. Uthman became the Third Rightly Guided Caliph in 644 A. C. From all the Caliphs he was the one more interest in religion than politics. During his Caliphate he completed the compilation of the Qur’an that still remains till today. Uthman ruled for twelve years, the first six years were marked to have been filled with peace and tranquility. The second half of his rule took a brutal turn. Rebellion rose, the Jews and the Magians were taking advantage of the whispers that were passing among the people and began conspiring against Uthman. Although with the size of his army he could have stopped all of them, he remembered the words of Muhammad, â€Å"Once the sword is unsheathed among my followers, it will not be sheathed until the Last Day. † Uthman didn’t want to be the first of the Caliphs to spill the blood of Muslims, so instead he tried to reason with them. This hardly did him any good and after a long battle the rebels broke into his home and murdered him. The last words Uthman spoke were that of the Qur’an 2:137, which speaks of God being all hearing and all knowing. He took his last breath on the Friday afternoon of June 656 A. C Ali, the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad himself was the final Caliph. At first he was very much reluctant to take the position but after he was urged by the other companions of the Prophet he accepted. Ali was responsible for the tradition of scholarship, although he too was assassinated. During his Caliphate internal tensions in the Muslim communities came to surface which lead to a period of civil war and political conflicts which ultimately led to the split in Muslims allegiances. This now known as the Sunni and Shi’ite schism. The differences between Sunni and Shi’ia Muslims are not in the written word, but rather they have political differences centred around who should be recognised as the leader of the Muslim community. The Sunni’s make up an estimate of 90% of Muslims in the world today and they believe that the leader of Muslims should be chosen among the descendants of the tribe of Muhammad, the Quraish tribe but not necessarily from the family of Muhammad. The world ‘Sunni’ itself mean tradition and in turn means that they support the Caliphate of all the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. The Shi’ites on the other hand only make up 10% of the Muslim population and the word Shi’ite means ‘the party of Ali’ and they believe that the leader of the Muslim community must be a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, the official term of a blood relative being ‘Imam’. This meaning out of all the Caliphs they only support the rule of Ali. Every single Caliph had an important part to play in the development of Islam and many people have them to thank for their religion and faith being as strong as it is today. Each of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs contributed to the safety and growth of Islam. Although with the split of Muslims that result of the Sunni and Shi’ite schism, everything was eventually kept under control. If conflicts do arise between the two, it will never result in another civil war as they have learnt from the past of the devastations it can cause.

Bilingualism and Brain Lateralization

Bilingualism and Brain Lateralization Polina Gavrilova Brain Lateralization and Neural Networks in Bilinguals In recent years, various studies have been conducted on bilingualism in regard to the neural basis of the first language (L1) and second language (L2) processing. The new technical advances, such as position emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are used to determine whether L1 and L2 share a common neural network or whether languages are represented in different areas of the brain (Dehaene et al., 1997; Perani et al., 1998; Liu, Hu, and Peng, 2010). Studies in neuropsychology have shown that for most people language processing takes place in the perisylvian areas of the left hemisphere. Research on bilinguals and polyglots who suffered brain injury revealed that occasionally aphasia affects only one of the languages that were previously acquired. This finding suggests that languages are represented in different parts of the brain (Paradis, 1995, cited in Perani et al., 1 998) and that L2 has reduced leftward lateralization (Albert Perani et al., 1998; Liu, Hu, and Peng, 2010). This paper examines whether L1 and L2 are supported by a common neural system or whether a dedicated cortical area represents each language. Furthermore, this paper identifies neural substrates activated by L1 and L2 during auditory, word production, and picture naming tasks. Dehaene et al. (1997) examined bilinguals (French-English) who acquired L2 after the age of seven. The researchers found that while listening to a task the superior temporal sulcus (STS), superior and middle temporal guri (STG and MTG), temporal pole (TP), and left angular gyrus (AG) were constantly activated in the left hemisphere for L1. STS and TP were also activated in the right hemisphere but it varied across subjects and the activation wasn’t as strong as in the left hemisphere. In addition, the neural pathway didn’t extend to AG. The findings for L2 showed greater inter-subject varia bility than for L1. The results of fMRI found that six subjects activated STS, STG, and MTG in the left temporal lobe for L2. However, the pixels of these activations were dispersed compared to the results for L1. The second language didn’t cause any activation in the left TP and AG. Also, some of the subjects didn’t show any neural activation in the left temporal region, which suggests that L2 is mostly dominated by their right hemisphere. The results also displayed that subjects activated additional resources while listening to L2. These additional sub-regions were the right STG and STS in the right temporal lobe. In addition, results of L2 showed that some subjects activated various networks outside the temporal lobe. Specifically, these subjects used the left inferior frontal gyrus, located in the Broca’s area, the inferior precentral sulcus, and the anterior cingulate. The research shows that L1 consistently activated the temporal lobe, especially stimulati ng the STS, STG, and MTG in the left hemisphere. Some subjects also activated these cerebral regions for L2 but with greater dispersion. Participants had strong leftward lateralization for L1 and inconsistent lateralization patterns for L2 across subjects. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that L1 is represented in the left hemisphere for most people. Furthermore, the study suggests that late bilinguals require additional neural networks for L2. Therefore, some subjects recruited left inferior frontal gyrus, which is responsible for language production to help maintain L2 while processing it during tasks. The anterior cingulate was another additional resource, which is responsible for attention and control. This suggests that L2 is not as autonomic as L1 and subjects needed more resources and attention to process L2 (Pardo et al., 1990; Posner Paulesu, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1993, cited in Dehaene et al., 1997).

Discuss the extent to which economic integration within the EU has Essay - 1

Discuss the extent to which economic integration within the EU has been subordinated to the achievement of political objectives - Essay Example World War; the legal, economic and political framework of the EU is rooted in the Franco-German tradition, which has lent itself to EU tensions with the political agendas of certain other member states such as Britain (Lippert, 2001, p.114). The fragmentation of the single monetary union and the EU agenda with national political agendas has become increasingly prominent in relation to the EU enlargement programme particularly with the controversial Turkey accession question remaining uncertain (Lahav, 2004, p.113). Indeed, Artis & Nixon suggest that the EU’s economic objectives in the last decade have reached crisis point on grounds of the bicycle theory paradigm, where there is a â€Å"slowing of momentum precedes collapse, or in this case crisis† (Artis & Nixon, 2007, p.1). In supporting their proposition, Artis and Nixon comment that as follows: â€Å"the list of setbacks is rather a long one. The negative outcomes of the referenda on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005 must head the list because of their symbolic significance†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ these cannot but induce a loss of confidence in the viability of the European Union† (2007, p.1). They further argue that the EU relies on co-ordination and mutual co-operation of states and that the enlargement of the EU and free movement within the labour market rules has fuelled numerous derogations from certain member states (2007). This in turn has raised the question as to the extent to which national political objectives are actually taking precedence to EU economic objectives. For example, Artis and Nixon refer to the fact that many member states opt out or derogate or suspend certain obligations to address national political agendas such as certain member states derogating from the free movement of workers provisions for a period of seven years and the conditions of former communist Eastern European states as part of EU enlargement (2007). With regard to the latter, the continuation of the

Statuses and roles correspond (Sociology) Research Paper

Statuses and roles correspond (Sociology) - Research Paper Example Status is important since along with it are the different set of rights, obligations and roles of an individual is defined. While ascribed status is more of an association with your family and your group, race or economic standing, achieved status is more of an effort of the individual and is more fluid and changes over time. My own status as a middle-class individual or part of the common people is associated with my financial standing in the society. Living in a foreign land, my status as a foreigner gives me a reputation that I am not one of the people in this land and that I may seem different. Though through time, I have gained the status as a student and a manicurist, the roles and responsibilities assigned to be are limited by my ascribed status. Being a student also limits my roles, responsibilities and opportunities since I have yet to go up the status ladder. I believe that my master status right now is being a foreigner in this land, being a different nationality and being an employed student. The ascribed and achieved status that I have been assigned to is how the society sees me and in turn, the status I am in is how the society expects me to act and work with the flow of the

International diversification Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

International diversification - Essay Example The United States and the two European countries i.e. Germany and Poland. If we suppose that an investor from the UK diversifies his portfolio of investments in the stock market of these three international countries. The differences in the statistics shown in the Fig1 propose that the level of risk and return would certainly vary from country to country that will ensure maximum returns for investors.  International portfolio diversification is highly beneficial in a situation where the stock exchanges, economic condition and political environment of international countries are highly different from each other. Syriopoulos also says that â€Å"if returns from investments in different national stock markets are not perfectly correlated and the correlation structure is stable, there are potential gains from international portfolio diversification.† (2004, p1254) It is so because the diversification would not yield the desired results if the conditions and environment in intern ational countries vary in the same manner as in domestic economy. If the international countries included in the portfolio have an economic, political and investment environment that differs from that of the domestic environs, the international portfolio diversification will reap significant benefits.The Capital Asset Pricing Model is an effective tool for portfolio management. Because of the model’s efficiency in pricing assets, it is considered to be useful in evaluating risk and return on various assets in a given portfolio.... rnational portfolio diversification." (2004, p1254) It is so because the diversification would not yield the desired results if the conditions and environment in international countries vary in the same manner as in domestic economy. If the international countries included in the portfolio have an economic, political and investment environment that differs from that of the domestic environs, the international portfolio diversification will reap significant benefits. Question 2: The Capital Asset Pricing Model is an effective tool for portfolio management. Because of the model's efficiency in pricing assets, it is considered to be useful in evaluating risk and return on various assets in a given portfolio. The most significant usefulness of the CAPM in portfolio analysis is its effectiveness in illuminating the risk factor involved in a portfolio investment. Andre explores that "the CAPM tells us that investors pay a price for being undiversified in that they are taking risks for whic h they are not being compensated." (2004, p19) For un-diversifiable or systematic risk, this model uses Beta as a means to identify the rate of risk involved in investment. CAPM can thus be useful for investors in portfolio management by providing relevant information concerning the risk factor involved in a particular investment with respect to the whole market and also lead the investors to improve their portfolio. With the help of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the investors can easily determine the required rate of return with respect to different assets in the portfolio according to their risk without any efforts to estimate revenues and cash flows. Andre illuminates that in order "to find the expected return of a company's shares, it is thus not necessary to carry out an

Action Research- The starting point speech Assignment

Action Research- The starting point speech - Assignment Example This almost astonished me and led me to research the significance of learning English with respect to the impact of pupil’s interest and overall learning achievement. This helped me a great deal in initiating my starting point of research. For the purpose of understanding the impact of pupil’s interest in learning English language on overall learning achievement, I would categorize pupil into groups i.e. intensified interest in which students will be listed who claimed that learning English is very much important for them. The second group will include students who claim that learning English is to understand information in English whenever needed. This will help me understand the students who have more or less interest in learning English (Altrichter). I will also conduct a survey from both the groups before and after undertaking complete activities and tests as per the curriculum. In this way I will be able to measure the learning by evaluation undertaken so far throughout the semester. Also, to note is the fact that there have been a number of researches which have evaluated the learning patterns of non-speaker individuals in English courses but the aspect has been relatively touched to a shallow extent. It is for this reason that my research will help understanding the student’s self-implied approach to learn English language (Altrichter). As a starting point to the research, I will be taking a closer look at the databases to evaluate the past contribution made by different investigators done so far. This will not just help me to learn about the research method but also help in understanding the ethical and moral concerns of the research. I am also going to help my pupil learn English as per the approach they would want to take in the semester instead of putting my own chosen research criteria

Saudi Aramco Oil Company Dissertation Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 10000 words

Saudi Aramco Oil Company - Dissertation Example The scope of Business Social Responsibility (BSR) includes production and company operation. Moon’s (2002) concept of BSR expands to financial contributions to community and governmental causes. BSR focuses on the social responsibility of business while CSR is a general term that encompasses many aspects of CSR. CSR’s general concept is about the community, the employees, the environment, human rights, and so on. BSR is appropriate in the study of social responsibility of Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas industry since it focuses on governmental and public causes that include environmental protection and cause-oriented projects. This chapter scrutinizes the past and current issues on CSR and how they could be related in the context of the aim and objectives of this dissertation. 2.2 Definition of corporate social responsibility The term corporate social responsibility refers to a corporate framework consisting of economic, environmental and social issues (Tokoro 2007, p. 148) that are incorporated into the responsible performance of the firm. CSR is sometimes referred to as a corporate duty and responsibility to the community and the environment. CSR practices of firms emphasise environmental protection without financial consideration in return (Huang 2010, p. 642). The World Business Council defines CSR as an obligation to provide economic development and improvement of employees’ quality of life and the community they belong. CSR includes an interaction with the community and the different stakeholders. Some aspects of CSR aim for sustainable development. Sustainable development involves ‘systematic and long term use of natural resources’ (Huang 2010, p. 643) with the primary objective of having it available for the present and the future generation; meaning, CSR is meeting the needs of the present generation without disregarding the future generation. It may also refer to the necessities of development and progress for coun tries without damaging environmental resources. Sustainable development refers to development wherein the environmental indicators have the same significance with economic indicators. Sustainability involves long-term goals that concern ecological, political, economic and societal ramifications. (Huang 2010, p. 643) Many authors conclude that there is no universal definition for CSR. A common definition failed because CSR is a socially constructed concept. There are components in the different definitions that are common, for example voluntary, the stakeholder, legal obligation, economic, social, human right, etc., which when understood will lead to greater insight of what CSR is in the nation that is being practiced and the world at large. 2.2.1 Theories of CSR Social Responsibilities of the Businessman was an article written by Bowen in 1953 which shifted the social responsibility of business to CSR. Since then the study of CSR has grown bringing into the fore terminologies, theor ies and practices in the different fields. Topics on CSR have also evolved that included society and business, social issues management, stakeholder management, corporate accountability, and much more. Recently, authors added the topics on corporate citizenship and corporate sustainability. (Garriga & Mele 2004, p. 51) Popular concepts relate CSR theories with the environment (which relate to resources and economics), goal attainment (linked to politics), and social

Business environment Coursework Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 2

Business environment - Coursework Example A language barrier presents a cultural issue among the large passenger population. The main issues include different preference on the meals, on board entertainment and overall flight communication problems between the crew and passengers. Virgin Atlantic airline overcomes legal challenges of handling arising misunderstandings during the cargo business. Different commitments within American and the United Kingdom players translate to varying results. Virgin Atlantic invests on the cargo business to ensure consistency and service reliability. As such, the airline is an award winning company over the last years. The airline uses â€Å"VEX† as an express courier, â€Å"MUST RIDE† to ensure urgency and the â€Å"PETS† to fly the pets. The airline also uses different sized cargo equipment such as p6p, ALF and AKE to ensure goods safety. The involved agreement policy honor terms of business delivery irrespective of the destination. Virgin Atlantic airlines also incorporates advanced information technology to deliver quality services. The airline combines advanced technology with available top-notch skilled power to change passenger experiences. A change of the communication channels in the airline entails the use of mobile technologies for the restaurant services. Services to passenger entails sending direct complimentary food vouchers top passengers’ mobile device. The flexibility in technology enables Virgin Atlantic to lead the airline industry. Virgin Atlantic airlines operate under a digitalized environment. The company’s expenditures revolve around employing the wide use of the internet to offer services, advertise company offers and to enhance customer transactions. As such, the airline manages to increase about 2% of the total number of passengers

Bahrain History Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Bahrain History - Essay Example During the country’s expansion period, it first experimented with municipality as a means of keeping up with burgeoning educational, social and economic demands symbolized by the rapid pace the country was expanding. Its implementation helped the country manage these aspects and it is with this introduction that this paper will look at the Bahrain municipal council in relation to its municipality by law, its municipality restoration dates, number of councils, objective of the councils, structure of the council, and the duties of its members. Municipality councils or anything of its kind did not exist in the Bahrain state before 1919. The real reason as to why the municipality was set up by the Bahrain State was mainly to serve and aid its citizens in different sectors of their lives. In addition, it was meant to help them strategize or organize their daily lives, mainly in the year 1337 during the months of Do-Aloqdah. This corresponded with 1919 July when the Bahrain government established the Bahrain municipality that is based in Manama and in the entire Arabian world or Arabian area. It was considered as the first of such establishments and this made it unique. As modernization begun in Bahrain, an order was issued in accordance to this progress on 20/1/1920 and the above-described municipality became the first official department of its kind set up in Manama. Moreover, it was passed into law starting the municipality process in the Bahrain history. In 1339, the municipality council was established corresponding to t hat of 1920 as the first administrative structure in the country. It had a modest budget and the council was established as the first developed administrative body in Bahrain to manage the country’s affairs (Seddon 1). The first dignitary to preside over the Bahrain municipal council was the late Isa Alkhalifa. This is until the end of 1920 when he succeeded his highness. During this period, the municipality council members increased

Individual and the community Essay Example for Free

Individual and the community Essay There tends to be quite a large use of extended metaphors within the play referring to the individual and the community frequently. Translations is said by many to be an intelligent and enlightening metaphor for the situation in Northern Ireland. This statement can be backed up and the reader can see many representations throughout the play. The most obvious example is that of the situation between Maire and Yolland on page 62. A significant part of this scene is when Maire says that leap across the ditch nearly killed me, as she is really symbolising the change the Irish people must undergo. Therefore, individuals are used to represent different views and cultures, as well as having their own. Characters are used mainly as a metaphor for Irelands position with the English. This is evidence of a particularly good playwright. Friel uses Sarah as a symbol to represent Baile Beags loss of language as the English arrive to anglicise the Irish counties. We know from historical references that the English did anglicise much of Ireland, resulting in a loss of language, as shown with Sarahs particularly similar situation. As the play progresses in the beginning, Sarahs speech begins to improve, but when the English come, Sarahs speech is lost again, which symbolises the English power over Ireland and how they are able to make change to the language with Sarah individually and the whole of Ireland nationally. Other scenes such as in act two scene one, we see stage directions create a bond between brothers and indicate a distance between cultures; as Manus moves beside OWEN, we begin to realise the general stance of the British and the Irish divide The mythology Jimmy Jack studies once again acts as a metaphor for the situation Baile Beag have created for themselves the community are locked in time as the play states it can happen that a civilisation can be imprisoned in a linguistic contour that no longer matches the landscape of fact. Words in the beginning paragraph such as disused and remains imply that this is a hedge school of a traditional heritage, which represents Ireland and its Irish culture at the present time. There are also many issues based around identity within the play, and this is reflected with peoples actions and the way that they change from the beginning of the play to the end. Many characters manage to find themselves and realise what their direction in life is. Translations seems to revolve around the subject of names the most obvious being the Name Book and the individual identity. As each character enters a scene, Friel gives a detailed description of them, providing the reader with an immediate image. The character then progresses and adopts their own personality and identity. In the case of Sarah, she is described as being waiflike and unintelligible. As the play progresses, Sarahs identity changes as she learns to speak. Later, Friel uses Sarahs identity to represent the more timid people of Ireland as she becomes incoherent. Another example is the character of Maire. Maire is described as a strong-minded and strong-bodied woman at the start of the play, but, by the end, seems to have become distant as if shed been washed away by her contact with the English, and, more importantly, with Yolland. Therefore, individual identity can alter when situations change. Friel created Jimmy Jack as an eccentric, an infant prodigy. He acts as a symbol of an attachment to the past, and cannot differentiate between fantasy and reality. This takes both a political and social stand towards Baile Beag. Is it so bad that Jimmy Jack has to resort to living in a fantasy world? This relates to the flaws within Baile Beag, which, in turn, make up most of the community. Those who live there are trapped in a linguistic contour, speaking dead languages, whilst those who are of a greater education such as Hugh, Jimmy Jack and Owen have many more faults than those less educated; Hugh has a severe drinking problem, Jimmy Jack fixed in his fantasy world and Owens rejection from his father as a translator. Jimmy Jacks poor dress sense and almost tramp like appearance acts as a metaphor for Ireland itself, proving although they live on an old island, with an old language and culture, there are still things to be cherished, that are rich and should be preserved. This is a rich community full well of educated people such as Hugh and Jimmy Jack, which is being understated. Throughout the play, many individuals are mentioned who are not characters in the play. The first is Daniel OConnell who is referred to by Maire on page 24, and who Hugh calls that little Kerry politician. Daniel OConnell was, in fact, known as the liberator who fought for political rights for Irish Roman Catholics. He was obviously a very powerful individual as he is one of the only real people mentioned in the play. Historically, Daniel OConnell, was also known as the uncrowned leader of Ireland acts a symbol of Hughs position within Baile Beag. He encouraged the use of English in National schools, which is essentially what Hugh did when he applied to the National School near Baile Beag. Yolland and Hugh talk about the second famous individual; William Wordsworth, on page 49. He was an English romantic poet, and because of this, Hugh dismisses him and states that he is not familiar with his literature. Throughout the play, Friel tries to include as many well known events and characters as possible to add a sense of realism. Therefore, certain famous individuals, and the mention of them, boost the readers interest and increase the level of validity. The community is presented to us as being close, but with the English trying to anglicise, we realise that this is far from the true realisation. For example Maire and Manus; once engaged, but with the Anglicisation, Maire realises she wants better things from life, and proceeds to find these in Yolland, the Englishman. Language also this splits this pair apart too, as we see Yolland disappear towards the end of the play, with the suspicion that he has been killed by the Donnelly brothers for breaking up the community. Overall, Friel shows the audience that the individual and the community are intertwined and are similar in their symbolism and characteristics. As language is integrated within society, the community is forced to separate. Individuals are described and portrayed as the powerful essence of a community, whilst the community itself symbolises the much-needed unity in order to preserve the culture and the individual identity of Ireland.

Family Essay Example for Free

Family Essay Every time we have a family gathering in our house, informal debates are always part of the â€Å"program†. My family and I are delighted to involve talking about current issues especially that concerns the humanity’s welfare morals. It will start from simple talks and later become a big debate amongst our family members. It sounds funny but that is how we have our family gatherings. In fact, discussing current issues make our spirits alert and alive but if there is none, our gathering will become boring and seems incomplete. I personally really like exchanging ideas and point of views from others. Through them, I can learn many insights and know their position regarding the issue, whether they are pro or not. This kind of characteristic really runs in my veins. I am a kind of person that will truly stand for what I believe is right. I will never concede to a perverse beliefs and ideas. Even though I have this kind of attitude that like to debate even on simple issues, I do still have my friends that stick with. There are times that we argue on nonsense things that sometimes lead us to a â€Å"fight†. I can still remember one incident that I and one of my closest friends had a fight over on one issue and that is upholding the good morals. I know we have different views when it comes to that matter. She is quite liberated but I am a reserved and quite conservative type of person. So if we talked over on morality, our ideas always clash and it is not new to me at all. Yes, we are friends but I do not do what she does and she does not do what I do because of our opposite views when it comes to morality. The argument started when she confessed to me that she and her boyfriend had indulged into premarital sex several times. My initial reaction was shocked. I was not able to talk for a moment because of her confession to me. I was shocked with her confession not because the idea itself is new to me but because I was not expecting them do it. I trusted her boyfriend very much that he will not do anything wrong to my friend because I expect him as a person who wants my friend to be preserved even we are in this perilous times where our morals are already deteriorating. I am not against on the idea of having sex because it is a gift of God to be enjoyed by individuals specifically for the married people but doing it outside marriage is a very big â€Å"no, no† to me. And I don’t even say that I want her to be like me because I do believe on individualism. All I want to see is, she will learn how to respect her own self and not allowing anyone, not even her â€Å"beloved† boyfriend, abused her body and take advantage on her. In this modern world, several people either young or old, of legal age or not are into it. It becomes a trend of our society. If you don’t experience it, people will regard you as â€Å"loser† and coward but if you do, you will gain their appreciation and approval. See? This is how our world being corrupted of worldly pleasures. And I don’t believe that if everybody is doing it, it is already right. We have to uphold our morals as people and not letting the things of this world influence and corrupt our good character. That is one of my convictions as a person. Furthermore, she continued to relay to me the things they did in full details and silence came up in the atmosphere. I just allowed her pour out her heart on me. After a few minutes, I asked her why she sticks for that idea and permitted it to happen. But she only answered, â€Å"Why not? Everybody is doing it. And besides, we love each other very much. I was very annoyed and disgusted with her answer but I tried to hold back my temper and trying to make a â€Å"good† discussion with her regarding the matter. So, I continued asking her. â€Å"Do you think that is the only way you can express your love to your boyfriend? † I asked. Then, answered back â€Å"what do you mean? We do this because we love each other. Don’t you understand! And don’t you ever dare to dictate my life on what should I do. You are not my parents! † she exclaimed. Those words struck me a lot. I am just discussing this matter to her because I love her as my dear friend and I want the best for her. I am hoping that, through our discussion, she can be able to realize the possible things that might happen to her in the future if she and her boyfriend will continually indulge on it. So I told her that even though everybody is doing it, it doesn’t mean that it is already right. My point was, even though everything is permissible but not everything is beneficial. Everything is permissible but not everything is constructive. What seems right to our eyes may lead us into destruction. I told her that she is just destroying her life. Her dignity as a woman was lost. I am trying her to understand my point that I would just want her to preserve her virginity until she will get married because that would be the only best gift she can give to her husband aside from her precious love. But she chose not to understand my point because she was â€Å"extremely† in love with that guy. I can understand her feelings but I can’t tolerate her actions. What she only thinks is the present happiness and not looking for the possible consequences in the future. I told her that every action she will be doing has its consequence. It might be right or wrong. Then, I asked again. â€Å"What if you get pregnant? Is he willing to accept the responsibilities and marry you? † She was silent for awhile and thinking for an answer. â€Å"Well†¦My boyfriend loves me so much and I am pretty sure that he will! † she replied and I can see her trying to convinced herself as she said those words to me. â€Å"Oh, well†¦ if that’s the case, I can’t force you to listen to my advices. I respect your opinion and decision because that is your life. But, always remember that I am not intruding your personal life. I am just worried what might be the consequences of your action and if you are really ready to face that consequence. † I responded. So, that argument is closed and I am thinking that it will never be an issue again to both of us. As time passes by, she continued to share to me what she and her boyfriend were doing and it was all about their sex escapades. I do listen to her even I do not like what I am hearing. I am trying my very best to understand her and remind her that it is not yet late to change. But she will just tell me that there is nothing wrong with her. In fact, she is very proud to experience it. One day, she phoned me and asked if we can dine out. We went to our favorite restaurant. When I saw her, she looked restless and haggard. I smiled at her and asked, â€Å"What is wrong? How are you and your boyfriend? † She just smiled bitterly to me. â€Å"Why? † I asked again. â€Å"I am pregnant and I do not know what to do with this baby. † I just looked at her and never said anything for a second. â€Å"I will abort this baby! † She started to cry. â€Å"No! † I said. â€Å"Did your boyfriend learn about this? † What did he say? † As I asked those questions, tears kept falling on her eyes. â€Å"Tell me†¦ What did he say about the baby? † I repeated. â€Å"He wanted me to abort the baby? He doesn’t want to marry me because we are still young and he has no job yet. I told her to keep the baby and never mind her boyfriend. Anyway, she can take care and provide the needs of her baby if she wants to. But she told me straight on my face that she will abort the baby. Due to her confusions, abortion came up into her mind as an ultimate answer for her recent problem. I told her that she already committed sin once, the sin of committing premarital sex, and now she should not sin again by aborting her own child. It is not right. It is morally not right. You are killing an innocent child, a child that has no strength to defend and fight for himself. This time, I persistently argued with her not to abort her baby. I told her that the guilt will always haunt her for the rest of her life. She might escape the shame for having a baby without a husband but she will not surely escape the guilt that will forever haunt her conscience. She was very stubborn because she told me that she needs to abort the baby because she cannot handle the responsibilities and the shame. I told her that all those scorns from other people will just pass and never be remembered again as the time will pass but the life of her baby cannot be withdraw from death once it is aborted.

Knowledge Invented Or Discovered Philosophy Essay

Knowledge Invented Or Discovered Philosophy Essay The meaning and difference between Discovered and Invented is the first knowledge issue that comes up after reading the title. How do we categorize something as being discovered or invented? Are all inventions discoveries; or all discoveries inventions? The word discovered means to gain knowledge or awareness of something not known before, whereas invent means to create or produce something that did not exist before. The areas of knowledge are mathematics, natural sciences, human sciences, history, arts and ethics. But due to the word limit constraints, it is difficult to take all areas of knowledge into account. So, I will take 2 areas of knowledge and discuss them. First lets take history into account. The past is fixed; immutable and absolutely certain. Nothing we can do can change it. Therefore, we hold up history as the model for truth and certainty. BUT!!! This is what we think. We do not take into account the bigger side of this. How can we be sure what the historians tell us is right? How can we be sure that this is what definitely happened in the past? All the above sayings tell us one thing that history is completely different from what we consider it to be. This is because all historians research the past with certain interest or questions in their mind, pick out only the pieces that are relevant to their investigation, and assemble them in different ways. All historians are selective and they select on the basis of their own paradigms. All historians are humans and their history is based on their own particular interest, which probably are dependent on their own culture. For example, if we consider a situation where people plant bombs maybe in an attempt to force the government to make some changes according to their wishes; now in this situation, I and probably most of the people will call it terrorism as it is killing innocent people. BUT, some people will probably call it freedom- fighting. This situation probably has arisen in history many times, but as I said before, all historians will portray this situation according to what they believe. This obviously means that history is altered according to different historians. A proof of this maybe found in two different history books where one historian might have portrayed the above situation as terrorism and the other as freedom- fighting. So, the conclusion to all the above arguments leaves us with the belief that history is invented according to different historians, what they believe and what they think about the situation. BUT, as being a TOK student, the second side of the arguments also has to be explored. People say that history is constructed by biased historians working with biased sources which are why there is no such thing as historical truth. But just because their work is selective, it does not mean it is that they have twisted it. There might be several accounts of a particular event and none of it might be true, or there might be true pieces in each. The historian recognizes the problem, and looks to solve them. They give explanations with developed reasons. Theories, arguments and accounts all examined and questioned. And plus, there is a pressing moral need for us to acknowledge the reality of the past. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it Santayana. In conclusion for history, I think it cannot be characterized as either invented or discovered. I think, it is BOTH, invention AND discovery. The next area of knowledge I would discuss is mathematics. Maths- invented or discovered? This question has been debated on since a very long time but till now, a particular conclusion has not yet been reached. Some people believe that maths was invented, while some believe that it was discovered. The problem that arises here is that people who say that maths is invented and people who say that maths is discovered both have reasonable evidences to prove themselves, which is why not even one can be proved wrong. The view that maths is out there waiting to be discovered is called the platonic view of maths, named after Plato, who thought that mathematical truths are eternal and unchanging. For example, if we consider the Pythagoras theorem, of course it did not exist before as a theorem, but surely their truth values did exist. For instance, anyone who happened to build squares from the sides of a right angled triangle would find that the area of the square of the hypotenuse would equal the area of the other two squares combined. The name of Pythagoras theorem is definitely an invention, but the mathematical relationship obviously existed before it was discovered. But then again, there are some difficult questions raised in response to Platos theory, such as where did maths exist? How do we discover maths? Many believe that the only reasonable answers suggest that maths is purely in the mind. And Plato could probably not have argued on this because he had argued that we are just remembering things that we already knew but had forgotten. But if maths really is in the mind, then isnt it an invention? In counter argument to the above two questions, I can give an example. For example you are in a maths class and given a problem to solve. Has it never happened that you solved the problem without being provided with a method to solve it? Yes! It has happened. At least with me it has. We were give a math question and not told a method of how to solve it. But surprisingly, a few students in the class got the correct answer. This means that the solution was found all the by those few students all by themselves. That solution existed which is why it occurred to the students and they solved it. This somehow proves Platos theory. Phi (Golden Ratio) as a mysterious number has been discovered in many areas, such as art, architectures, humans, and plants. According to the history of maths, Phi was first understood and used by the ancient mathematician in Egypt, two to three thousand years ago, due to its frequent appearance in Geometry. Phidias (500BC-432 BC), a Greek sculptor and mathematician, studied Phi and used the Phi in many designs of his sculptures, such as the statue of the goddess Athena in Athena, and the state of god Zeus in Olympiad. This means that the theorem of phi did exist before, and it was discovered but the name phi (golden ratio) was obviously invented. Same is the case with natural constants (e and ln), their values, properties and functions did exist before which discovered but their names and symbols were invented. In my opinion, like history, it is not accurate to characterize maths as either invented or discovered. It is both invention and discovery; they work hand in hand. People think that there is an enormous body of mathematical knowledge, partially discovered, and waiting patiently for people to come along and dig it out. Well, thats definitely fairly the case; nobody is ever going to invent any maths that wasnt already true. I mean, no matter how hard you try, youre never going to be able to prove that 2+2=6. The concepts and theorems are discovered while the symbols are invented. In conclusion, I will say that I dont agree with the main claim that some areas of knowledge are discovered and others are invented. I think it is not accurate to say that some areas of knowledge are either invented or being discovered. In my opinion, they work hand in hand, together supporting a particular subject. Without either (discovery or invention), the subject remains incomplete, meaning that both are interdependent to complete a subject.

Re-interpretation of the Philosophical Thought of Benjamin Constant :: Philosophy Psychological Psychology Essays

Re-interpretation of the Philosophical Thought of Benjamin Constant ABSTRACT: The liberal French thinker Benjamin Constant develops a conception of human nature which shows the triplicity of being human. Such triplicity manifests itself in the close connection between emotion, rationality, and animality. He also develops an idea of liberty which treats it only as a real, historically conditioned minimalization of external limitations. Liberty thus understood enjoys metaphysical rootedness in human nature. 1. Introductory remarks Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), the French aristocrat, politician, one of the fathers of the French liberalism and, at the same time, the then well-known man of letters is also the author of a voluminous and almost unknown work about religion. It appeared in the years 1824-1833 in Paris in seven volumes, five of which are entitled "De la religion consideree dans sa source, ses formes et ses developpements", and two "Du Polytheisme romain considere dans ses rapports avec la philosphie grecque et la religion chretienne. Constant wrote this work through all his life, changing the fundamental theses and supplementing them as his theoretical knowledge about religion increased and as a result of his personal experiences connected with religion. Although the huge volume of the work is rather perceived as unattractive today and most of the historical material is out of date, it contains interesting philosophical theses which are the crowning achievement of the whole intellectual life of the a uthor. These theses allow us to understand and interpret better the philosophical foundations of Constant's liberalism which are created, among others, by a certain understanding of the human nature i.e. a certain philosophical anthropology, whereas the latter induces an understanding of liberty, peculiar for the Constantian liberalism. 2. The human nature. Constantian theses contained in the work on religion and refering to the human nature can be formulated as follows: 1. A man is not entirely the product of society in which he lives and its culture, but he is a being that can be defined by his stable and unchangeable nature. 2. What the human nature is like can be judged by examining the behaviours common to all people and their creations, for example religion. 3. The human nature is unchangeable . However, the forms change, through which it manifests it self in various periods of the development of humanity. In people's religious behaviour, for example, there is manifested something which is the permanent source of every religion and is inherent in human nature.

Two Autonomous Women in American Literature Essay -- social issues, wo

In American history, women have not always had the same rights and opportunities of men. Yet, there were exceptions throughout history of women casting aside the general role of just a mother or housewife. Two fictitious examples occur in the book The Awakening by Kate Chopin, and the play Macbeth by William Shakespeare. In The Awakening, Edna, the protagonist of the story, undergoes a realization that her nineteenth-century lifestyle is not the way she wants to live. She rebels against being treated like a piece of property and tries to break free of societies laws. Macbeth tells the story of a man named Macbeth and his wife Lady Macbeth who desires to become queen. Lady Macbeth is the one who told him to kill the current king Duncan to become king himself. Both Edna and Lady Macbeth portray examples of women with autonomy, but the one who displays the characteristics of autonomy the best is Edna. Edna is more autonomous than Lady Macbeth, who only influences rather than displ ay her own independence, because she takes a stand against society, which is the ultimate act of independence. Lady Macbeth is inarguably a very strong, powerful woman with a lot of control, especially at the beginning of the play. This quote explains the extent of her control over her husband, â€Å"Lady Macbeth appears to be somehow in league with evil and Macbeth its victim, a fly in the spider’s web who struggles mightily but cannot escape† (Johnson). She manipulates her husband to get him to do what she wants. When she learns of his destiny to become king, she can’t just let him sit around waiting on it to happen; she knows he has to act. She tells Macbeth he has to kill king Duncan and overrides his objections. Lady Macbeth tries to commit the mu... ...to live, has more autonomy than Lady Macbeth who could only persuade. Both of these women are extremely strong and independent, which makes it very difficult to decide between them. In the end though, Edna is the more autonomous because she held her beliefs until the very end. Lady Macbeth let her ideas get the better of her and felt the guilt of these ideas. So in conclusion, Edna is the more autonomous woman out of the two. Both women were strong and brave for being different in a time when being different was not acceptable. Works Cited Chopin, Kate. The Awakening. New York: Dover Publications, 1993. Print. Dominic, Catherine C. ed. Shakespeare’s Characters for Students. Detroit: 1997. Print. Johnson, Vernon Elso. ed. Social Issues in Literature. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2009. Shakespeare, William. Macbeth. Logan, IA: Perfection Learning, 2004. Print.

Human Trafficking Essay -- Crime

Human Trafficking is the unlawful trade of human beings for various purposes such as reproductive slavery or sex slavery. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] protocol on trafficking, â€Å"Trafficking in Persons is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation† (UNODC). Human Trafficking is a growing phenomenon. It is one of the fastest growing types of transnational crime worldwide. According to the US State department’s 2009 â€Å"Trafficking in Persons Report,† at least 12.3 million adults and children fall victim to human traffickers every year (qtd in Haerens 17). Human Trafficking occurs on every continent and has been booming. One reason for the increase in human trafficking is because of globalization. When competing in the global marketplace companies and corporations need cheap labor, and they don’t care where it comes from. This in turn, causes the employment recruiters (the traffickers) to go after their prey (the trafficked). Human Trafficking can be thought of as a national security implication. One case of involuntary or forced servitude, standing alone, does not constitute a breach in national security. When viewed as a whole, in relation to human trafficking, this is considered as a major breach in National Security and should be treated as a serious crime. According to Rizer and Glaser â€Å"the crime of trafficking in persons has recently been added... ...demic Search Complete. Web. 21 Mar. 2012. Haerens, Margaret. Human Trafficking. New York: Greenhaven Press, 2012. Print. â€Å"Human Trafficking.† United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC, 2012. Web. 4 April. 2012. Kloer, Amanda. "Sex Trafficking and HIV/AIDS." Human Rights 37.2 (2010): 8-25. Academic Search Complete. Web. 24 Mar. 2012. Ojeda, Auriana. Slavery Today. New York: Greenhaven Press, 2004. Print. Pati, Roza. "States' Positive Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev V. Cyprus and Russia." Boston University International Law Journal 29.1 (2011): 79-142. Academic Search Complete. Web. 23 Mar. 2012. Rizer, Arthur and Sheri R. Glaser. "Breach: The National Security Implications of Human Trafficking." Widener Law Review 17.1 (2011): 69-94. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.

Nutrition and Nutrient Content Labels Essay

1. What was the purpose of testing distilled water with each indicator? The purpose of testing distilled water was to have a standard for the other samples. 2. Given what you know about diabetes, explain why diabetics have to pay attention to the types of foods they ingest? Diabetics have to pay attention to the types of foods they eat because their bodies cannot break down and use glucose correctly. So, if they have too much glucose, they could go into diabetic shock. 3. List any of the food samples that tested positive for more than one type of molecule. Explain why it is an advantage for us to eat foods that contain more than one type of molecule. Peanuts tested positive for more than one type of molecule. The advantage of eating foods with more than one type of molecule is that the body can get the proper amount of the molecule they need more efficiently. 4. In the United States, processed food must be labeled showing information about the nutrient content. It has been argued that requiring nutritional information on these foods is too costly for consumers, because the cost to test the foods is added to the price of the food item. What is your position on this issue? In the space below, write a five to eight sentence paragraph giving at least three reasons in support of your position. Write a paragraph either in support of the current laws that require nutritional labeling, or in favor of making nutrient content labels optional. Support your position with logical, well thought out arguments. I feel that they should continue making nutrient content labels mandatory.

Russell-Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge

Pg1Pg1 KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE I53 Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description Bertrand Russell Russell, Bertrand (1917). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910-1911. Reprinted in his his Mysticism and Logic (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. : 1917). Reprinted Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1951, pp. 152-167. Pagination here matches the latter. ) THE object of the following paper is to consider what it is that we know in cases where we know propositions about ‘the so-and-so' without knowing who or what the so-and-so is.For example, I know that the candidate who gets most votes will be elected, though I do not know who is the candidate who will get most votes. The problem I wish to consider is: What do we know in these cases, where the subject is merely described ? I have considered this problem elsewhere1 from a purely logical point of view; but in what follows I wish to consider the questio n in relation to theory of knowledge as well as in relation to logic, and in view of the above-mentioned logical discussions, I shall in this paper make the logical portion as brief as possible.In order to make clear the antithesis between ‘acquaintance' and ‘description', I shall first of all try to explain what I mean by ‘acquain- tance'. I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i. e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation.That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. But the associations and natural extensions of the word acquaintance are different from those of the word presentation. To begin with, as in most cognitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted with an object even at moments when it is not actually before my mind, provided it has been before my mind, and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is the same sense in which I am said to know that 2+2=4 even when I am thinking of something else. In the second place, the word See references later. acquaintance is designed to emphasize, more than the word presen- tation, the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, a danger that, in speaking of presentation, we may so emphasize the object as to lose sight of the subject. The result of this is either to lead to the view that there is no subject, whence we arrive at materialism; or to lead to the view that what is presented is part of the subject, whence we arrive at idealism, and should arrive at solipsism but for the most desperate contortions.Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object in my terminology, because this dualism seems to me a fundamental fact concerning cognition. Hence I prefer the word acquaintance, because it emphasizes the need of a subject which is acquainted. When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is sense-data. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. The sense-datum with which I am acquainted in these cases is generally, if not always, complex.This is particularly obvious in the case of sight. I do not mean, of course, merely that the supposed physical object is complex, but that the direct sensible object is complex and contains parts with spatial relations. Whether it is possible to be aware of a complex without being aware of its constituents is not an easy question, but on the whole it would seem that there is no reason why it should not be possible. T his question arises in an acute form in connection with self-consciousness, which we must now briefly consider.In introspection, we seem to be immediately aware of varying complexes, consisting of objects in various cognitive and conative relations to ourselves. When I see the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my seeing the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun; and when I desire food, it often happens that I am aware of my desire for food. But it is hard to discover any state of mind in which I am aware of myself alone, as opposed to a complex of which I am a constituent. The question of the nature of self-consciousness is too large, and too slightly connected with our subject, to be argued at length here.It is difficult, but probably not impossible, to account for plain facts if we assume that we do not have acquaintance with ourselves. It is plain that we are not only acquainted with the complex ‘Self-acquainted-with-A', but we also know the proposition ‘I am acquainted with A'. Now here the complex has been analysed, and if ‘I' does not stand for something which is a direct object of acquaintance, we shall have to suppose that ‘I' is something known by description. If we wished to maintain the view that there is noPg2Pg2 154 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC acquaintance with Self, we might argue as follows: We are acquainted with acquaintance, and we know that it is a relation. Also we are acquainted with a complex in which we perceive that acquaintance is the relating relation. Hence we know that this complex must have a constituent which is that which is acquainted, i. e. must have a subject- term as well as an object-term. This subject-term we define as ‘I'. Thus ‘I' means ‘the subject-term in awarenesses of which / am aware'.But as a definition this cannot be regarded as a happy effort. It would seem necessary, therefore, either to suppose that I am acquainted with myself, and that ‘I', therefore, requires no definition, being merely the proper name of a certain object, or to find some other analysis of self- consciousness. Thus self-consciousness cannot be regarded as throwing light on the question whether we can know a complex without knowing its constituents. This question, however, is not important for our present purposes, and I hall therefore not discuss it further. The awarenesses we have considered so far have all been aware- nesses of particular existents, and might all in a large sense be called sense-data. For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing. But, in addition to awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be called awareness of particulars, we have also (though not quite in the same sense) what may be called awareness of universals.Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a uni- versal of which we are aware is called a concept. Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow; this universal is the subject in such judgments as ‘yellow differs from blue' or ‘yellow resembles blue less than green does'. And the universal yellow is the predicate in such judgments as ‘this is yellow', where ‘this' is a particular sense-datum.And universal relations, too, are objects of awarenesses; up and down, before and after, resemblance, desire, awareness itself, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of which we can be aware. In regard to relations, it might be urged that we are never aware of the universal relation itself, but only of complexes in which it is a constituent. For example, it may be said that we do not know directly such a relation as before, though we understand such a proposition as ‘this is before that', and may be directly aware of such a complex as ‘this being before that'.This view, however, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that we often know propositions in which KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE I55 the relation is the subject, or in which the relata are not definite given objects, but ‘anything'. For example, we know that if one thing is before another, and the other before a third, then the first is before the third; and here the things concerned are not definite things, but ‘anything'. It is hard to see how we could know such a fact about ‘before' unless we were acquainted with ‘before', and not merely with actual particular cases of ne given object being before another given object. And more directly: A judgment such as ‘this is before that', where this judgment is derived from awareness of a complex, constitutes an analysis, and we should not understand the analysis if we were not acquainted with the meaning of the terms employed. Thus we must suppose that we are acquainted with the meaning of ‘before' , and not merely with instances of it. There are thus at least two sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars and universals.Among particulars I include all existents, and all complexes of which one or more constituents are existents, such as this-before-that, this-above-that, the-yellowness-of- this. Among universals I include all objects of which no particular is a constituent. Thus the disjunction ‘universal-particular' includes all objects. We might also call it the disjunction ‘abstract concrete'. It is not quite parallel with the opposition ‘concept-percept', because things remembered or imagined belong with particulars, but can hardly be called percepts. On the other hand, universals with which we are acquainted may be identified with concepts. ) It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other people's minds. These things are known to us by what I cal l ‘knowledge by description', which we must now consider. By a ‘description' I mean any phrase of the form ‘a so-and-so' or ‘the so-and-do'. A phrase of the form ‘a so-and-so' I shall call an ‘ambiguous' description; a phrase of the form ‘the so-and-do' (in the singular) I shall call a ‘definite' description.Thus ‘a man' is an ambiguous description, and ‘the man with the iron mask' is a definite description. There are various problems connected with ambiguous descriptions, but I pass them by, since they do not directly concern the matter I wish to discuss. What I wish to discuss is the nature of our knowledge concerning objects in cases where we know that there is an object answering to a definite description, though we are not acquainted with any such object. This is a matter which is concerned exclusively with definite descriptions.I shall, therefore, in the sequel, speak simply of ‘descriptions' when I mean Pg3Pg3 I56MYSTICISM AND LOGIC ‘definite descriptions'. Thus a description will mean any phrase of the form ‘the so-and-so' in the singular. I shall say that an object is ‘known by description' when we know that it is ‘the so-and-so', i. e. when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance.We know that the man with the iron mask existed, and many propositions are known about him; but we do not know who he was. We know that the candidate who gets most votes will be elected, and in this case we are very likely also acquainted (in the only sense in which one can be acquainted with someone else) with the man who is, in fact, the candidate who will get most votes, but we do not know which of the candidates he is, i. e. we do not know any proposition of the form ‘A is the candidate who will get most votes' where A is one of the candidates by name.We shall say that we have â€Å"merely descriptive knowledge' of the so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although we may possibly be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition ‘a is the so- and-so', where a is something with which we are acquainted. When we say ‘the so-and-so exists', we mean that there is just one object which is the so-and-so. The proposition ‘a is the so-and-so' means that a has the property so-and-so, and nothing else has. Sir Joseph Larmor is the Unionist candidate' means ‘Sir Joseph Larmor is a Unionist candidate, and no one else is. ‘ ‘The Unionist candidate exists' means ‘someone is a Unionist candidate, and no one else is. ‘ Thus, when we are acquainted with an object which we know to be the so- and-so, we know that the so-and-so exists, but we may know that the so-and-so exists when we are not acquainted with any object whi ch we know to be the so-and-so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in fact, is the so-and-so. Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions.That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description. Moreover, the description required to express the thought will vary for different people, or for the same person at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the name is rightly used) is the object to which the name applies. But so long as this remains constant, the particular description involved usually makes no difference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in which the name appears.Let us take some illustrations. Suppose some statement made KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE I57 about Bismarck. Assuming that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance with oneself, Bismarck himself might have used his name directly to designate the particular person with whom he was acquainted. In this case, if he made a judgment about himself, he himself might be a constituent of the judgment. Here the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a description of the object.But if a person who knew Bismarck made a judgment about him, the case is different. What this person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected (rightly, we will suppose) with Bismarck's body. His body as a physical object, and still more his mind, were only known as the body and the mind connected with these sense-data. That is, they were known by description. It is, of course, very much a matter of chance which characteristics of a man's appearance will come into a friend's mind when he thinks of him; thus the description actually in the friend's mind is accidental.The essential point is that he knows that the various descriptions all apply to the sa me entity, in spite of not being acquainted with the entity in question. When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judgment about him, the description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge—? far more, in most cases, than is required to identify him. But, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that we think of him as ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire'. Here all the words are abstract except ‘German'.The word ‘German' will again have different meanings for different people. To some it will recall travels in Germany, to some the look of Germany on the map, and so on. But if we are to obtain a description which we know to be applicable, we shall be compelled, at some point, to bring in a reference to a particular with which we are acquainted. Such reference is involved in any mention of past, present, and future (as opposed to definite dates), or of here and there, or of what others have told us.Thus it would seem that, in some way or other, a description known to be applicable to a particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing described is not to be merely what follows logically from the description. For example, ‘the most long-lived of men' is a description which must apply to some man, but we can make no judgments concerning this man which involve knowledge about him beyond what the description gives.If, however, we say, ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist', we can only be assured Pg4Pg4 158MYSTICISM AND LOGIC of the truth of our judgment in virtue of something with which we are acquainted—? usually a testimony heard or read. Considered psychologically, apart from the information we convey to others, apart from the fact about the actual Bismarck, which gives importance to our judgment, the thought we really have contains the one or more particulars involve d, and otherwise consists wholly of concepts.All names of places—? London, England, Europe, the earth, the Solar System—? similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. I suspect that even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves such a connection with particulars. In logic, on the contrary, where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved.It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bi smarck is unknown to us.But we know that there is an object B called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus describe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, ‘B was an astute diplomatist', where B is the object which was Bismarck. What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck, and that, however we may vary the description (so long as the description is correct), the proposition described is still the same.This proposition, which is described and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, and do not know it, though we know it is true. It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from acquaintance with particulars: there is Bismarck to people who knew him, Bismarck to those who only know of him through history, the man with the iron mask, the longest-lived of men. These are progressively further removed from acquaintance with particulars, and there is a similar hierarchy in the region of universals.Many universals, like many particulars, are only known to us by description. But here, as in the case of particulars, knowledge concerning what is known by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance. KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 159 The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.From what has been said already, it will be plain why I advocate this principle, and how I propose to meet the case of propositions which at first sight contravene it. Let us begin with the reasons for supposing the principle true. The chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it seems scarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgment or entertain a supp osition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about. If we make a judgment about (say) Julius Caesar, it is plain that the actual person who was Julius Caesar is not a constituent of the judgment.But before going further, it may be well to explain what I mean when I say that this or that is a constituent of a judgment, or of a proposition which we understand. To begin with judgments: a judgment, as an occurrence, I take to be a relation of a mind to several entities, namely, the entities which compose what is judged. If, e. g. I judge that A loves B, the judgment as an event consists in the existence, at a certain moment, of a specific four-term relation, called judging, between me and A and love and B.That is to say, at the time when I judge, there is a certain complex whose terms are myself and A and love and B, and whose relating relation is judging. My reasons for this view have been set forth elsewhere,1 and I shall not repeat them here. Assuming this view of judgment, the constituents of the judgment are simply the constituents of the complex which is the judgment- Thus, in the above case, the constituents are myself and A and love and B and judging. But myself and judging are constituents shared by all my judgments; thus the distinctive constituents of the particular judgment in question are A and love and B.Coming now to what is meant by ‘understanding a proposition', I should say that there is another relation possible between me and A and love and B, which is called my supposing that A loves B. 2 When we can suppose that A loves B, we ‘understand the proposition' A loves B. Thus we often understand a proposition in cases where we have not enough knowledge to make a judgment. 1 Philosophical Essays, ‘The Nature of Truth. ‘ I have been persuaded by Mr Wittgenstein that this theory is somewhat unduly simple, but the modification which I believe it to require does not affect the above argument [1917]. Cf. Mei nong, Ueber Annahmen, passim. I formerly supposed, contrary to Meinong's view, that the relationship of supposing might be merely that of presentation. In this view I now think I was mistaken, and Meinong is right. But my present view depends upon the theory that both in judgment and in assumption there is no single Objective, but the several constituents of the judgment or asaumption are in a many-term relation to the mind. Pg5Pg5 160MYSTICISM AND LOGIC Supposing, like judging, is a many-term relation, of which a mind is one term.The other terms of the relation are called the constituents of the proposition supposed. Thus the principle which I enunciated may be re-stated as follows: Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted. This is merely to say that we cannot make a judgment or a supposition without knowing what it is that we are making our judgment or supposition about.It seems to me that the truth of this principle is evident as soon as the principle is understood; I shall, therefore, in what follows, assume the principle, and use it as a guide in analysing judgments that contain descriptions. Returning now to Julius Caesar, I assume that it will be admitted that he himself is not a constituent of any judgment which I can make. But at this point it is necessary to examine the view that judgments are composed of something called ‘ideas', and that it is the ‘idea' of Julius Caesar that is a constituent of my judgment.I believe the plausibility of this view rests upon a failure to form a right theory of descriptions. We may mean by my ‘idea' of Julius Caesar the things that I know about him, e. g. that he conquered Gaul, was assassinated on the Ides of March, and is a plague to schoolboys. Now I am admitting, and indeed contending, that in order to discover what is actually in my mind when I judge about Julius Caesar, we must substitute for the proper name a description made up of some of the things I know about him. (A description which will often serve to express my thought is ‘the man whose name wasJulius Caesar. ‘ For whatever else I may have forgotten about him, it is plain that when I mention him I have not forgotten that that was his name. ) But although I think the theory that judgments consist of ideas may have been suggested in some such way, yet I think the theory itself is fundamentally mistaken. The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the ‘idea' of something outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that, since judgment is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the mind of the person judging.But in this view ideas become a veil between us and outside things—? we never really, in knowledge, attain to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things. The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure, and, so far as I can see, nothing discoverable by inspection warrants the intrusion of the idea between the mind and the object. I suspect that the view ii fostered by the dislike of relations, and that it is felt the mindKNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCEl6l could not know objects unless there were something ‘in' the mind which could be called the state of knowing the object. Such a view, however, leads at once to a vicious endless regress, since the relation of idea to object will have to be explained by supposing that the idea itself has an idea of the object, and so on ad infinitum. I therefore see no reason to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object, there is in us something which can be called the ‘idea' of the object.On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation, not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by advocates of ‘ideas'. This is, of course, a large question, and one which would take us far from our subject if it were adequately discussed. I therefore content myself with the above indications, and with the corollary that, in judging, the actual objects concerning which we judge, rather than any supposed purely mental entities, are constituents of the complex which is the judgment.When, therefore, I say that we must substitute for ‘Julius Caesar' some description of Julius Caesar, in order to discover the meaning of a judgment nominally about him, I am not saying that we must substitute an idea. Suppose our description is ‘the man whose name was Julius Caesar'. Let our judgment be ‘Julius Caesar was assassinated'. Then it becomes ‘the man whose name was Julius Caesar was assassinated'. Here Julius Caesar is a noise or shape with which we are acquainted, and all the other constituents of the judgment (neglecting the tense in ‘was') are concepts with whic h we are acquainted.Thus our judgment is wholly reduced to constituents with which we are acquainted, but Julius Caesar himself has ceased to be a constituent of our judgment. This, however, requires a proviso, to be further explained shortly, namely, that ‘the man whose name was Julius Caesar' must not, as a whole, be a constituent of our judgment, that is to say, this phrase must not, as a whole, have a meaning which enters into the judgment. Any right analysis of the judgment, therefore, must break up this phrase, and not treat it as a subordinate complex which is part of the judgment.The judgment ‘the man whose name was Julius Caesar was assassinated' may be interpreted as meaning ‘one and only one man was called Julius Caesar, and that one was assassinated'. Here it is plain that there is no constituent corresponding to the phrase, ‘the man whose name was Julius Caesar'. Thus there is no reason to regard this phrase as expressing a constituent of the jud gment, and we have seen that this phrase must be broken up if we are to be acquainted with all the constituents of the judgment. This conclusion, which we have reached from considerations concerned with the theory of knowledge, is also forced uponPg6Pg6 162MYSTICISM AND LOGIC us by logical considerations, which must now be briefly reviewed. It is common to distinguish two aspects, meaning and denotation, in such phrases as ‘the author of Waverley'. The meaning will be a certain complex} consisting (at least) of authorship and Waverley with some relation] the denotation will be Scott. Similarly ‘feather-less bipeds' will have a complex meaning, containing as constituents the presence of two feet and the absence of feathers, while its denotation will be the class of men.Thus when we say ‘Scott is the author of Waverley' or ‘men are the same as featherless bipeds', we are asserting an identity of denotation, and this assertion is worth making because of the dive rsity of meaning. 1 I believe that the duality of meaning and denotation, though capable of a true interpretation, is misleading if taken as fundamental. The denotation, I believe, is not a constituent of the proposition, except in the case of proper names, i. e. of words which do not assign a property to an object, but merely and solely name it.And I should hold further that, in this sense, there are only two words which are strictly proper names of particulars, namely, T and ‘this. ‘2 One reason for not believing the denotation to be a constituent of the proposition is that we may know the proposition even when we are not acquainted with the denotation. The proposition ‘the author of Waverley is a novelist' was known to people who did not know that ‘the author of Waverley' denoted Scott. This reason has been already sufficiently emphasized.A second reason is that propositions concerning ‘the so-and-so' are possible even when ‘the so-and-so' has no denotation. Take, e. g. ‘the golden mountain does not exist' or ‘the round square is self- contradictory'. If we are to preserve the duality of meaning and denotation, we have to say, with Meinong, that there are such objects as the golden mountain and the round square, although these objects do not have being. We even have to admit that the existent round square is existent, but does not exist. 3 Meinong does not regard this as a contradition, but I fail to see that it is not one.Indeed, it seems to me evident that the judgment ‘there is no such object as the round square' does not presuppose that there is such an object. If this is admitted, however, we are led to the conclusion that, by parity of form, no judgment concerning ‘the so-and-so' actually involves the so-and-so as a constituent. 1 This view has been recently advocated by Miss E. E. C. Jones. ‘A New Law of Thought and its Implications,' Mind, January, 1911. * I should now exclude ‘ I' from proper names in the strict sense, and retain only ‘this' [1917]. †¢? Meinongj Ueber Annahmen, 2nd ed. , Leipzig, 1910, p. 141. KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 163Miss Jones1 contends that there is no difficulty in admitting contradictory predicates concerning such an object as ‘the present King of France', on the ground that this object is in itself contradictory. Now it might, of course, be argued that this object, unlike the round square, is not self-contradictory, but merely non-existent. This, however, would not go to the root of the matter. The real objection to such an argument is that the law of contradiction ought not to be stated in the traditional form ‘A is not both B and not B', but in the form ‘no proposition is both true and false*.The traditional form only applies to certain propositions, namely, to those which attribute a predicate to a subject. When the law is stated of propositions, instead of being stated concerning subjects and pred icates it is at once evident that propositions about the present King of France or the round square can form no exception, but are just as incapable of being both true and false as other propositions. Miss Jones2 argues that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley' asserts identity of denotation between Scott and the author of Waverley.But there is some difficulty in choosing among alternative meanings of this contention. In the first place, it should be observed that the author of Waverley is not a mere name, like Scott. Scott is merely a noise or shape conventionally used to designate a certain person; it gives us no information about that person, and has nothing that can be called meaning as opposed to denotation. (I neglect the fact, considered above, that even proper names, as a rule, really stand for descriptions. But the author of Waverley is not merely conventionally a name for Scott; the element of mere convention belongs here to the separate words, the and author and of and Waverley. Given what these words stand for, the author of Waverley is no longer arbitrary. When it is said that Scott is the author of Waverley, we are not stating that these are two names for one man, as we should be if we said ‘Scott is Sir Walter'. A man's name is what he is called, but however much Scott had been called the author of Waverley, that would not have made im be the author; it was necessary for him actually to write Waverley, which was a fact having nothing to do with names. If, then, we are asserting identity of denotation, we must not mean by denotation the mere relation of a name to the thing named. In fact, it would be nearer to the truth to say that the meaning of ‘Scott' is the denotation of ‘the author of Waverley'. The relation of ‘Scott* to Scott is that ‘Scott' means Scott, just as the relation of ‘author' to the concept which is so called is that ‘author' means this concept. 1 Mind, July, 1910, p. 80. ‘ Mind , July, 1910. p. 379. Pg7Pg7 164MYSTICISM AND LOGIC Thus if we distinguish meaning and denotation in ‘the author of Waverley', we shall have to say that ‘Scott' has meaning but not denotation. Also when we say ‘Scott is the author of Waverley', the meaning of ‘the author of Waverley' is relevant to our assertion. For if the denotation alone were relevant, any other phrase with the same denotation would give the same proposition. Thus ‘Scott is the author of Marmion' would be the same proposition as ‘Scott is the author of Waverley'.But this is plainly not the case, since from the first we learn that Scott wrote Marmion and from the second we learn that he wrote Waverley, but the first tells us nothing about Waverley and the second nothing about Marmion. Hence the meaning of ‘the author of Waverley' as opposed to the denotation, is certainly relevant to ‘Scott is the author of Waverley'. We have thus agreed that ‘the author of Wav erley' is not a mere name, and that its meaning is relevant in propositions in which it occurs.Thus if we are to say, as Miss Jones does, that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley' asserts an identity of denotation, we must regard the denotation of ‘the author of Waverley' as the denotation of what is meant by ‘the author of Waverley'. Let us call the meaning of ‘the author of Waverley' M. Thus M is what ‘the author of Waverley' means. Then we are to suppose that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley' means ‘Scott is the denotation of M But here we are explaining our proposition by another of the same form, and thus we have made no progress towards a real explanation. The denotation of M,' like ‘the author of Waverley', has both meaning and denotation, on the theory we are examining. If we call its meaning M', our proposition becomes ‘Scott is the denotation of M†. But this leads at once to an endless regress. Thus the attempt to re gard our proposition as asserting identity of denotation breaks down, and it becomes imperative to find some other analysis. When this analysis has been completed, we shall be able to reinterpret the phrase ‘identity of denotation', which remains obscure so long as it is taken as fundamental.The first point to observe is that, in any proposition about ‘the author of Waverley', provided Scott is not explicitly mentioned, the denotation itself, i. e. Scott, does not occur, but only the concept of denotation, which will be represented by a variable. Suppose we say ‘the author of Waverley was the author of Marmion', we are certainly not saying that both were Scott—? we may have forgotten that there was such a person as Scott. We are saying that there is some man who was the author of Waverley and the author of Marmion.That Is to say, there is someone who wrote Waverley and Marmion, and no one else wrote them. Thus the identity is that of a variable, i. e. of KNO WLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 165 an identifiable subject, ‘someone'. This is why we can understand propositions about ‘the author of Waverley', without knowing who he was. When we say ‘the author of Waverley was a poet', we mean ‘one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he was a poet'; when we say ‘the author of Waverley was Scott' we mean ‘one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he was Scott'. Here the identity is between a variable, i. . an indeterminate subject (‘he'), and Scott; ‘the author of Waverley' has been analysed away, and no longer appears as a constituent of the proposition. 1 The reason why it is imperative to analyse away the phrase, ‘the author of Waverley' may be stated as follows. It is plain that when we say ‘the author of Waverley is the author of Marmion', the is expresses identity. We have seen also that the common denotation, namely Scott, is not a constituent of this proposition, while the meanings (if a ny) of ‘the author of Waverley' and ‘the author of Marmion' are not identical.We have seen also that, in any sense in which the meaning of a word is a constituent of a proposition in whose verbal expression the word occurs, ‘Scott' means the actual man Scott, in the same sense (so far as concerns our present discussion) in which ‘author' means a certain universal. Thus, if ‘the author of Waverley' were a subordinate complex in the above proposition, its meaning would have to be what was said to be identical with the meaning of ‘the author of Marmion'.This is plainly not the case; and the only escape is to say that ‘the author of Waverley' does not, by itself, have a meaning, though phrases of which it is part do have a meaning. That is, in a right analysis of the above proposition, ‘the author of Waverley' must disappear. This is effected when the above proposition is analysed as meaning: ‘Some one wrote Waverley and no one else did, and that someone also wrote Marmion and no one else did. ‘ This may be more simply expressed by saying that the propositional function ‘x wrote Waverley and Marmion, and no one else did' is capable of truth, i. e. ome value of x makes it true, but no other value does. Thus the true subject of our judgment is a propositional function, i. e. a complex containing an undetermined constituent, and becoming a proposition as soon as this constituent is determined. We may now define the denotation of a phrase. If we know that the proposition ‘a is the so-and-so' is true, i. e. that a is so-and-so and nothing else is, we call a the denotation of the phrase ‘the so- 1 The theory which I am advocating is set forth fully, with the logical grounds in its favour, in Principia Mathematica, Vol. I, Introduction, Chap.Ill; also, less fully, in Mind, October, 1905. Pg8Pg8 166 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC and-so'. A very great many of the propositions we naturally make about Ã¢â‚¬Ë œthe so-and-so' will remain true or remain false if we substitute a for ‘the so-and-so', where a is the denotation of ‘the so-and-so'. Such propositions will also remain true or remain false if we substitute for ‘the so-and-so' any other phrase having the same denotation. Hence, as practical men, we become interested in the denotation more than in the description, since the denotation decides as to the truth or falsehood of so many statements in which the description occurs.Moreover, as we saw earlier in considering the relations of description and acquaintance, we often wish to reach the denotation, and are only hindered by lack of acquaintance: in such cases the description is merely the means we employ to get as near as possible to the denotation. Hence it naturally comes to be supposed that the denotation is part of the proposition in which the description occurs. But we have seen, both on logical and on epistemological grounds, that this is an error.The actual object (if any) which is the denotation is not (unless it is explicitly mentioned) a constituent of propositions in which descriptions occur; and this is the reason why, in order to understand such propositions, we need acquaintance with the constituents of the description, but do not need acquaintance with its denotation. The first result of analysis, when applied to propositions whose grammatical subject is ‘the so-and-so', is to substitute a variable as subject; i. e. we obtain a proposition of the form: ‘There is something which alone is so-and-so, and that something is such-and-such. The further analysis of propositions concerning ‘the so-and-so' is thus merged in the problem of the nature of the variable, i. e. of the meanings of some, any, and all. This is a difficult problem, concerning which I do not intend to say anything at present. To sum up our whole discussion: We began by distinguishing two sorts of knowledge of objects, namely, knowledge by acquain tance and knowledge by description. Of these it is only the former that brings the object itself before the mind. We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or other minds.We have descriptive knowledge of an object when we know that it is the object having some property or properties with which we are acquainted; that is so say, when we know that the property or properties in question belong to one object and no more, we are said to have knowledge of that one object by description, whether or not we are acquainted with the object. Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only knowledge by description, the descriptions involved being usually KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE167 such as involve sense-data.All propositions intelligible to us, whether or not they primarily concern things only known to us by description, are composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted, for a constituent wi th which we are not acquainted is unintelligible to us. A judgment, we found, is not composed of mental constituents called ‘ideas', but consists of an occurrence whose constituents are a mind1 and certain objects, particulars or universals. (One at least must be a universal. ) When a judgment is rightly analysed, the objects which are constituents of it must all be objects with which the mind which is a constituent of it is acquainted.This conclusion forces us to analyse descriptive phrases occurring in propositions, and to say that the objects denoted by such phrases are not constituents of judgments in which such phrases occur (unless these objects are explicitly mentioned). This leads us to the view (recommended also on purely logical grounds) that when we say ‘the author of Marmion was the author of Waverley', Scott himself is not a constituent of our judgement, and that the judgment cannot be explained by saying that it affirms identity of denotation with diversity of meaning. It also, plainly, does not assert identity of meaning.Such judgments, therefore, can only be analysed by breaking up the descriptive phrases, introducing a variable, and making prepositional functions the ultimate subjects. In fact, ‘the so-and-so is such-and-such' will mean that fx is so-and-so and nothing else is, and x is such-and-such' is capable of truth. The analysis of such judgments involves many fresh problems, but the discussion of these problems is not undertaken in the present paper. 11 use this phrase merely to denote the something psychological which enters into judgment, without intending to prejudge the question as to what this